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What Do a Pig and Socrates Have in Common?

The Debate Over Animal Consciousness in the Critical Philosophy

I. INTRODUCTION

> *It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.* – J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*

In thinking upon these words, I wish follow a venerable tradition in the history of philosophy: I will tear a passage of rhetorical brilliance completely out of its context, take it into metaphysical speculations which were never intended, through literal readings for which it never recommended itself, and hopefully in the process I will open up some interesting directions to thought. In particular, I wish to think on the question of animal consciousness, which lurks beneath the surface of Mill's text.

Mill has said that the human mental faculties are preferable to those of a pig and that someone who has them can be counted as happier, even if she is dissatisfied in many respects, simply because of the happiness that comes with such higher faculties. The pig, it is taken, is possessed of some sort of mind, but one which is distinctly lower than that of any human being, let alone Socrates. And this presents, I think, the view to which we find ourselves pulled when we observe our pets or other animals interacting with the world. Look at everything the pig does—it eats, it squeals, it turns this way or that based on what is set before its eyes. Surely there is more to it than the push and pull of its blood and sinews. Surely the pig is not like a rock; it has some sort of awareness of the environment within which it lives and acts.

On the other hand, we are also inclined to say that non-human animals in general, including pigs, are extremely different from human beings with respect to the mind. The pig squeals, but it does not speak. I could not hope to have a discussion about the nature of justice with it, or even last weekend's football game, not only because the pig cannot speak, but because it simply does not know anything about these things at all. Indeed, we doubt whether there is reason to say that the pig knows anything at all.

Here we have both sides of the comparison. The life of a pig, for Mill, is less happy than the life of even a dissatisfied human being, because with respect to the cognition of a human, the pig is an imbecile. It is a being possessed of the lower faculties of bodily gratification but none of the higher faculties of reason and knowledge.

At this point, there seem to be two propositions which we may take, for the time being at least, as *endoxa:*

a) **Pigs are conscious**

b) **Pigs' consciousness does not attain the level of human reason and knowledge**

A pig and Socrates have something in common, consciousness, and it is in this commonality that we can make an intelligible comparison. But the consciousness that each of them has is of a very different character, in that the pig lacks reason and Socrates has it. In this difference the preference in the comparison becomes clear.

But here a worry begins to disclose itself for those engaged in the Critical philosophy. For let us look again at (b). A *prima facie* plausible interpretation of (b) seems that the pig does not attain knowledge because it does not employ the categories in experience as humans do. This is, in fact, the doctrine expressed by Kant, that animals have *'apprehensio bruta'* without knowledge or employment of the categories. However, as soon as we have formulated the issue

in this manner, we should immediately begin to wonder whether what we have just said is intelligible. Since for Kant, the categories are the necessary conditions of any possible experience of the objective world, is there a way in which I can make sense of the claim that there is something which does not employ the categories and yet is conscious?

In his *Commentary* on the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Norman Kemp Smith develops an interpretation of Kant on which a consciousness apart from the categories is inconceivable. The natural consequence of this is that non-human animals, if they do not employ the categories, cannot be said to be conscious at all. H. J. Paton, in his *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience,* alleges that Kemp Smith has read Kant wrongly, and that Kant's view allows—and ought to allow—for animal *consciousness,* though it rules out the possibility of non-human animals having *knowledge.* Indeed, for Paton, the common sense status of both (a) and (b) is sufficiently good that the denial of animal consciousness is a deeply objectionable part of Kemp Smith's understanding of Kant's doctrine.

In thinking on these questions, we must raise four primary questions. First: what exactly is the question over which Paton and Kemp Smith quarrel? Second: on which side of the issue should we understand Kant to be? Third: which view on the issue is right? And fourth: what does the resolution of the issue over the categories mean for our understanding of animal consciousness?

II. Blind and Empty

In a shining passage of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Immanuel Kant writes that "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind" (A51 = B75). It is pretty well established within the study of the Critical philosophy that Kant is criticizing a

certain model of human knowledge here, on which either intuitions are taken to be a confused but forceful sort of thought (rationalism), or else thought concepts are taken to be entirely the creatures of intuitions (empiricism). Concepts and intuition, thought and sensibility, are *separate functions* which are nevertheless *suited to* one another, whose character is such that neither can have objective purport without the other. And what the transcendental unity of apperception has joined, let no man put asunder.

However, it is not quite clear what exactly was entailed in the marriage vows. Kant could here be saying either of two things. (1) On the one hand, he could be arguing that all intuitions and concepts are *ontically* bound together, in such a way that a divorce between the two is incoherent and inconceivable. Thoughts without content would be empty, and intuitions without concepts would be blind, but we cannot make any sense of empty thoughts or blind intuitions. On this view, Kant's work in the *Critique* is to elucidate the structure of intuition and sensibility in such a way as to show that such a divorce of intuition from intellect is incoherent, that we can make no sense of the idea of an intuition which is not, in recognition under the categories, directed upon an objective state of affairs in the world. (2) On the other hand, Kant may be arguing that they are *epistemically* bound together, in such a way that a divorce between the two is conceivable, but that so divorced they could never provide knowledge about the world. Thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind, and so when or if I have them, they do not give me any knowledge. On this view, Kant is accepting the conceivability of presentations that are not directed to an objective state of affairs in the world, but articulating precisely this fact, that they cannot have any purport to an objective state of affairs in the world.

One of the theses that Norman Kemp Smith advances in his *Commentary* is that the

Critique of Pure Reason was assembled out of a sort of 'patchwork,' including passages of the older, pre-Critical views which eventually drove Kant to develop the first *Critique*, and also passages of the more mature views which he worked out in the Copernican process of developing the *Critique*. Among the older elements of "pre-Critical or semi-Critical survival" (218), are passages in which Kant seems to understand his project on the terms of interpretation (2). In such passages, particularly I.§13 of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, one finds the "repeated assertion that representations can be consciously apprehended independently of all relation to the faculty of understanding" (222). However, for Kemp Smith, "the revolutionary discovery, the truly Copernican hypothesis" (222) holds that (1) is the correct approach, such an apprehension is unintelligible, and the claim to such an apprehension is based on the pre-Critical vestige of the 'transcendental object.' This more mature view is, on Kemp Smith's view, expressed in all of the more mature sections of the *Critique,* including I.§14 and elsewhere in the progress of the Transcendental Deduction.

Paton quarrels with the conception presented by Kemp Smith on two grounds. First, at the level of scholarship, he rejects the 'patchwork theory' of the first *Critique*, and believes that Kemp Smith is being overly hasty in his reading of Kant. In order to vindicate his first objection, he holds that "The best refutation of this doctrine is to be found in an exposition which shows Kant's arguments to be intelligible and consistent" (328), which leads him directly into his second objection: Paton believes that Kemp Smith's understanding of Kant hastily ascribes to Kant an inconsistency in doctrine by assuming that Kant began from interpretation (2) but passed over to (1) in the course of time. Rather, Paton argues, a more careful reading of Kant, along with a better understanding of what interpretation (2) will entail, will show Kant to be consistent on tthis issue and also right.

Further, Paton argues, Kemp Smith's interpretation is objectionable on the grounds that it rules out apriori the possibility of non-human animals having consciousness. But with a properly nuanced understanding of what position (2) entails, one can read Kant as endorsing (2) consistently, and as endorsing the possiblity of animal consciousness. With this understanding, Kemp Smith's teaching is a hasty and illegitimate attempt to use transcendental philosophy, in order to abort what should be an open question for empirical psychology.

III. THE ARGUMENT

The quarrel between Paton and Kemp Smith may be seen by considering the two *endoxa* from which we began, and adding Kemp Smith's interpretation of Kant to them as a third assertion:

a) **Pigs are conscious.**
b) **Pigs do not employ the categories in experience**
c) **Beings that are conscious employ the categories in experience**

The three propositions clearly form an inconsistent triad, and one of them must be rejected. We have rephrased (b) in accordance with the formulation that Kant, Paton, and Kemp Smith find acceptable, that pigs' lack of rationality consists in their lack of employment of the concepts. Since all involved take it for granted that (b) is true, the quarrel between Kemp Smith and Paton rests in whether to reject (a) or (c). For Kemp Smith, (c) is a fundamental principle of the Critical philosophy, and so (a) must be sacrificed to it. Paton, on the other hand, holds that (c) is a claim about empirical psychology, and that there is no philosophical reason why it ought to be preferred to (a), which has some grounding in our common sense reaction to the world.

Furthermore, each man believes that his own view is endorsed by Kant in his most mature and considered views. For Kemp Smith, this was a matter of overcoming the pre-Critical

legacy found elsewhere in the Critique; Paton, on the other hand, believes that Kant agreed with him at the start and the end of the day.

Before moving on to resolve this question through exposition of the texts, however, I am going to raise a worry in order to dispense with it. Kemp Smith argues that we can have no consciousness except through the categories, and Paton disagrees. We have observed that their disagreement comes to a disagreement over whether or not there can be consciousness which has no objective purport, whether consciousness is always and everywhere referred to an object. It will not make any headway, however, to refer this question to the problem of illusion. Both Kemp Smith and Paton will agree that hallucinations and delusions *have objective purport;* illusions are directed toward the world in that they represent an objective state of affairs. What distinguishes hallucinations from veridical intuitions is that in hallucinations, they *falsely* represent an objective state of affairs. Part of what it is to have a hallucination of a dagger is to be able to ask of it, "Is this a dagger I see before me?" Here, the seeming intuition is *wrongly* referred to the objective world, but that is quite different from *not being referred to it at all.* If the latter case obtained, then I would not think of it as an illusion at all, because it would not be directed toward the world; it would merely be an independent happening in my field of consciousness. The question of right or wrong reference is an empirical question to be answered by thought under the categories about the facts of the matter; the question of reference itself is the transcendental question to be resolved by the Critical philosophy.

IV. Terminology and Clarification

The debate here concerns "Whether intuitions can exist in human consciousness without being referred to an object" (Paton 331), that is, without being thought under the categories in

such a way as to be directed toward the objective world. If Kemp Smith is right, then being thought under the categories is an inescapable condition of being a presentation in consciousness at all, and so "no *representations* can exist for *consciousness* apart from the categories" (Paton 330). If Paton is right, on the other hand, then this logical impossibility claim is unfounded, and there can be representations—blind concepts, empty thoughts—which are present in consciousness but which are not referred to any object.

Therefore, it will be helpful to review Kant's 'chart' of the "names properly fitting each kind of presentation" (A319 = B376) in the Transcendental Dialectic:

> The genus is presentation as such (*repraesentatio*). Under it falls presentation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A *perception* that refers solely to the subject, viz., as the modification of the subject's state, is *sensation* (*sensatio*); an objective perception is *cognition* (*cognitio*). Cognition is either *intuition* or *concept* (*intuitus vel conceptus*). An intuition refers directly to the object and is singular; a concept refers to the object indirectly, by means of a characteristic that may be common to several things. A concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure concept;* and a pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called *notion.* A concept framed from notions and surpassing the possibility of experience is an *idea,* or concept of reason. (A320 = B376-377).

In the hierarchy of different forms of presentation, we may distinguish what will be especially relevant to the purposes of understanding the debate:

- **a)** ***Presentation*** in general
  - **i)** ***Perception*** present in the consciousness
    - **(1)** ***Sensation,*** purely subjective
    - **(2)** ***Cognition,*** directed towards object
      - **(a)** ***Intuition***
      - **(b)** ***Concept***

With this division on the table, we will immediately have to make another terminological clarification. Paton conceives of himself as arguing with Kemp Smith over "Whether intuitions can exist in human consciousness without being referred to an object" (331). This is a natural way of expressing what he wishes to say, but it is also ruled out if we work from the terminology

that Kant uses in his summary of terms. For here *intuition* is already defined as a *cognition*, a presentation with objective purport, and therefore must already bring being thought under the categories. The difficulty here, however, is lexicographical rather than philosophical, and we simply need to coin a new term for the sort of 'thin' intuition (a presentation without objective purport) that Paton wishes to discuss. For reasons that will become clearer below, I shall adapt Humean terminology. We will designate as an *impression* a sensory presentation without respect to whether or not it has objective purport. Since we have said 'without respect to' rather than 'without,' all *intuitions* will be *impressions;* the question is whether all *impressions* are *intuitions*. Paton maintains that there are impressions which are not intuitions; these could perhaps be qualified as *sensations* in Kant's schema above. Further, he holds that intuitions can be regarded as pure impressions by analytically removing objective purport from the presentation. Kemp Smith, in contrast, argues that there are no impressions which are not intuitions, and that one cannot intelligibly separate some blind 'impression' out of the intuition apart from objective purport.

Building upon this distinction will elucidate the disagreement between Paton and Kemp Smith over the necessary conditions of a consciousness. For Kemp Smith all consciousness is *experiential*: whenever I have an *impression* it must be an *intuition;* whenever I have *consciousness* it must be *experience* of the world. For Paton, on the other hand, there are impressions which are not objective intuitions, and consciousness which is not knowledge of the world. Throughout the Transcendental Analytic, Kant seeks to show that without synthetic apriori principles of the pure understanding, there is no experience and "We would in that way have only a play of presentations that would not refer to any object whatever; i.e., our perception would not at all distinguish one appearance from all others in terms of time relation" (A194 =

B239). It is clear that Kant denies that our consciousness *of experience* can be this way. But does he also intend to argue that our *consciousness* cannot be this way?

Here again it will be useful to distinguish two terms.[1] *Humean consciousness,* hereafter 'H-consciousness,' is consciousness without objective purport under the categories. *Kantian consciousness,* hereafter 'K-consciousness,' on the other hand, is the full-blooded consciousness of the world, synthesized under the categories and with objective purport toward states of affairs. K-consciousness is our experience of the world we grasp in *intuition* and *intellect*. H-consciousness, on the other hand, is what we would be left with if Hume were right that we lived only in a world of *impressions* connected by empirical rules of affinity and association. On Kemp Smith's view, H-consciousness cannot exist, for "Relation to an object is constituted by the categories, and is necessary in reference to sense-representations, because only thereby is consciousness of any kind possible at all" (222). There are no intelligible building blocks for H-consciousness in the first place, since there are no 'blind' impressions to be associated. Paton's view, on the contrary, is that H-consciousness is a possible form of consciousness, and that non-human animals have it. Their consciousness is an unknowing and ephemeral play of impressions, but it is still a consciousness.

V. KANT ON CONSCIOUSNESS

What relationship do the various views that we have placed on the table have to Kant?

[1] In what follows my terminology is indebted to Lewis White Beck, who distinguishes between L(ockean)-experience and K(antian)-experience, and also to C.I. Lewis, who distinguishes between 'thin' and 'thick' experience. I believe that their distinction and mine are more or less equivalent.

I prefer to retain the reference to Hume because Kant's discussion of what a non-categorial consciousness would look like, has a deep affinity for Hume's philosophy of experience—from the obvious reasons of historical influence. Indeed, if the speculation is true that a philosophy of mind is always true of the philosopher who holds it, then the subject matter of this paper could just as easily be reformulated as whether *David Hume* could have been said to be conscious.

It is clear enough—it is the very essence of the Critical philosophy—that for Kant, H-consciousness is not sufficient to make our experience of the world intelligible.[2] However, it remains an open question whether Kant believes that H-consciousness without K-consciousness is a possible form of consciousness. possessed by non-human animals (Paton also suggests infants), or whether it is a confused and confusing chimera, resulting from a failure to properly understand the limits of the employment of reason.

Kemp Smith believes that Kant clearly sides against the possibility of H-consciousness, drawing on several apparently relevant passages from the Transcendental Deduction. He believes that Kant is inconsistent on this matter, and that I.§13 proves itself to be a pre-Critical vestige in passages such as the following:

> With the *pure concepts of understanding,* on the other hand, begins the inescapable requirement to seek a transcendental deduction—not only of these concepts themselves, but also of space. For these concepts speak of objects through predicates of pure a priori thought, not through predicates of intuition and sensibility; hence they refer to objects universally, i.e., apart from all conditions of sensibility. (A87-88 = B120).
>
> The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not at all present to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Therefore objects can indeed appear to us without having to refer necessarily to functions of understanding, and hence without the understanding's containing a priori the conditions of these objects. (A89 = B122)
>
> For, I suppose, appearances appearances might possibly be of such a character that understanding would not find them to conform at all to the conditions of unity. Everything might then be so confused that, e.g., the sequence of appearances would offer us nothing providing us with a rule of synthesis and thus corresponding to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would then be quite empty, null, and without signification. But appearances would nevertheless offer objects to our intuition; for intuition in no way requires the functions of thought. (A90-91 = B123).

Kemp Smith here maintains that in this passage, 'objects' are things as they are in themselves ('apart from all conditions of sensibility'), and further that Kant at this point still takes the categories not to be employed immanently in experience, but rather to be employed to the

[2] Hume knew this too, but did not feel there was anything reasonable to be done about it.

transcendental object apart from any possible experience. At this point in his intellectual development, Kant has found himself rightly puzzled by the curious features of his pre-Critical account, that we can think things as they are in themselves without having any immediate sensible contact with things as they are in themselves. This curiosity elicits the need for the transcendental deduction, but.in the process of working through this curiosity, Kant found that the proper way to resolve it was to abandon this conception of the cateogries and "his previous abortive method of 'deduction'" (Kemp Smith 221) in favor of his "later more genuinely phenomenalist position" (2221), that objects intuited in sense are always thought under the categories, and that this thinking applies with objective validity only within the limits of experience.

This pre-Critical holdover, according to Kemp Smith, is what allows for the doctrine that intuition need not refer necessarily to objects. It is only by supposing that "Only in and through relation to an object can sense-representations be apprehended" is the question of how the categories refer a priori to objects—not *beyond experience*, but within experience and *beyond the content* of experience—immediately answered. The categories are necessary conditions of any possible experience as such, and no consciousness can occur except by being thought through them. In support of what he takes to be the mature Critical doctrine, Kemp Smith cites passages from I.§14 and the first four paragraphs of II, which he holds "makes a fresh start" and "stands in no necessary relation to any preceding section" (222). Thus Kant (I quote at length):

> But suppose that the presentation alone makes the object possible. In that case, while presentation in itself does not produce its object *as regards existence* ... yet presentation is a priori determinative of the object if *cognizing* something *as an object* is possible only through it. Now there are two conditions under which alone there can be cognition of an object. The first condition is *intuition;* through it the object is given, though only as appearance. The second condition is the *concept;* through it an object is thought that corresponds to this intuition. ... Now the question arises whether concepts do not also a priori precede objects, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited,

> yet thought as object as such. For in that case all empirical cognition of objects necessarily conforms to such concepts, because nothing is possible as *object of experience unless* these concepts are presupposed. But all experiences, besides containing the senses' intuition through which something is given, does also contain a *concept* of an object that is given in intuition, or that appears. Accordingly, concepts of objects as such presumably underlie all experiential cognition as its a priori conditions. Hence presumably the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thought in it is concerned). For in that case the categories refer to objects of experience necessarily and a priori, because only by means of them can any experiential object whatsoever be thought at all. (A92-93 = B125-126)

Here, Kemp Smith argues, Kant has fully recognized that (1) the basis for the deduction lies in the apriori elucidation of the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, and (2) that "save in and through *a priori* concepts no representations can exist for consciousness" (223).

Paton criticizes Kemp Smith for being overly hasty in a tendentious reading of these and the other key passages. He argues that there is a readily available and charitable understanding of these passages on which §13 and §14 are consistent with one another rather than a 'patchwork' of pre-Critical and Critical arguments. And further, this understanding has the added benefit of putting us in a position were we can grant consciousness to animals and read Kant as consistently endorsing the consciousness of animals.

The key to understanding Paton's criticism of Kemp Smith lies in the distinction between H-consciousness and K-consciousness. "For Kant," Paton argues, "*knowledge* or *experience* of objects requires both intuition (with its forms) and thought (with its categories)" (330). We do need *intuition* in the thick sense to have K-consciousness, the consciousness of an objective world about us. However, Paton continues, Kemp Smith is mistaken to leap from this to infer "that intuition could not exist in *consciousness* apart from thought, and so apart from the categories" (330). Necessary reference to the categories is *not* necessary for H-consciousness, and there is nothing in the passages under examination which would indicate that for Kant, K-consciousness is the only sort of consciousness. Again and again Kant refers to *experience* and

knowledge, but not of consciousness. He even speaks of *cognizing* something *as an object of experience* with the emphasis on these terms—as though he takes for granted that there is consciousness other than *cognizing* and thinking of an impression *as object.* In our everyday experience of the world, it is in fact true that "the intuition, or sensation, given to sense apart from thought is separated from experience by an act of analysis, and does not exist by itself in consciousness apart from thought" (331). Our experience of the objects of the world does not have any 'lag' between H-consciousness and experiential K-consciousness. But, Paton continues, "it does not follow that it is impossible to have conscious intuitions without *thinking* that they are intuitions of an object" (331). On Paton's view, "Whether intuitions can exist in human consciousness without being referred to an object"—and thus, also, the question of whether animals can have a non-categorical consciousness—is "a matter for empirical psychology" (331).

Paton is too hasty with his charity when he claims that there is no compelling reason to interpret §13 as inconsistent with §14 and other passages that Kemp Smith cites as 'mature' Critical passages. I do not doubt that Paton *might* be correct, but if he is, then Kant is speaking very sloppily, in a very dangerous way, throughout §13. If he is, consistently with other passages, discussing how impressions need not necessarily be cognized as objects of experience, then he should not have called them 'intuitions.' In Kant's own division of representations, *intuitions* are always cognitions with objective purport. Kant may simply be speaking sloppily here and falling into an equivocation on the word 'intuition.' However, his usage also quite justifies the drive in Kemp Smith to interpret Kant as holding the pre-Critical view that there can be *experience* of blind appearances without intellect, and load him up with all the pre-Critical baggage that accompanies that view.

In the consideration of Kant's mature view, whether or not §13 is taken to be indicative of it, it may seem as though Paton is stretching the words of the text and looking for loopholes. However, in consideration of the views that Kant expresses on animal consciousness, there are very good reasons to agree with Paton that Kemp Smith has been overly hasty.

VI. KANT ON ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS

With these competing views in mind, we turn to the question of animal consciousness. Both Kemp Smith and Paton draw on Kant's letters, in which he writes that animals possess "*apprehensio bruta* without consciousness" (qtd. in Paton 332). Kemp Smith again takes this as evidence that for Kant, there is no non-categorical consciousness, and so animals are not conscious. But here again Paton accuses Kemp Smith of hasty identifications. The German translated as 'consciousness' is *Bewusstsein.* Kemp Smith takes this to be consciousness in general. Paton, in contrast, contends that here Kant means, as he often does by *Bewusstsein,* self-consciousness, or apperception. Animals cannot be conscious of their H-consciousness as their own, for they would not "attain to that unity of consciousness which is necessary for knowing the self—For Kant knowledge of objects and knowledge of self are correlative terms" (333 and 333n3). But they can still possess H-consciousness, *brute apprehension* without *apperception.* Paton supports this by emphasizing a passage from Kemp Smith's second supporting passage, a parenthetical statement which Kemp Smith omits:

> They might still (if I conceive of myself as an animal) be able to carry on with regularity their play in me (a being unconscious of my own existence) as *ideas bound together by the empirical laws of association* and so having influence upon feeling and desire—it being assumed that I should be *conscious of each individual idea* but not its relation to the unity of representation of the object by means of the synthetic unity of its apperception—but I should not thereby be able to know anything, not even to know this state of myself. (qtd. in Paton 333, emphasis mine)

Kemp Smith's own source seems to be absolutely damning to his contention. For here Kant

insists that, if one imagines herself as an animal without the categories, one is *conscious* of each individual idea, but is not able thereby to *know* anything. There is no self-consciousness, and no directedness toward the world. But for animal consciousness, one *could* intelligibly imagine it as "ideas bound together by the empirical laws of association"—and what better description of *Humean* consciousness is there? "The categories, in short," as Paton writes, "are the conditions of knowledge both of self and of objects,"—the conditions of K-consciousness—"but they are not the conditions of consciousness"—where consciousness here is taken to include not just K-consciousness but also H-consciousness.

We have spent a great deal of time with the sorting out what it is that Kemp Smith, Paton, and Kant have said. Drawing from Kant's expressed views on animal consciousness, and a charitable interpretation of the key passages in the first *Critique,* seem to make it clear that Kant is sloppy on this issue, but probably sides with Paton against Kemp Smith. For Kant with Paton, a pig, like Socrates, can be conscious, but that the pig only has a non-categorial, Humean consciousness. However, in addition to this *quid facti,* there is also the *quid juris:* if Kant is being consistent in agreeing with Paton, then are they consistently *right* or consistently *wrong?* Does the notion of H-consciousness make sense, and should we say that the pig on whom we have been meditating has H-consciousness?

VII. Attributing Consciousness

Before we ask whether or not we can attribute H-consciousness to the pig, however, we will have to take a step back. What does it mean to *attribute consciousness* to anything? Why do I indubitably attribute consciousness to myself, readily attribute it to Socrates, cavil over whether or not to attribute it to a pig, and refuse to attribute it to a rock? I certainly do not experience

another being's consciousness when I attribute it, and I don't seem to infer it either—inference would only get me some kind of odd behaviorism. The structure of the act is queer, and I believe that the questions themselves are confused and confusing. To explicate the problem will require an excursus into Gottlob Frege's 'Thoughts.'

In 'Thoughts,' Frege distinguishes three realms with which a human being is acquainted. We begin with a fairly easy familiarity with the world of things perceived through our senses. And from living in that world of things, a person who reflects on her everyday experience will quickly distinguish two realms when it comes to the furniture of her experience: the realm of *things* and the realm of *ideas*. The denizens of the world of things are the familiar external objects she experience in her daily life, "things he can see and touch, can in short perceive with the senses, such as trees, stones, and houses" (13). By contradistinction, ideas reside in "an inner world distinct from the outer world" and include "creations of his imagination, of sensations, of feelings and moods" (14). Things are perceptible through the senses, whereas "ideas cannot be seen, or touched, or smelled, or tasted, or heard" (14). The realm of ideas essentially characterizes what is under consideration in the discussion of both K-consciousness and H-consciousness: they are both full of sensations, feelings, imagination, and so on.[3]

The characteristics of the denizens of the two realms sharply separates them. Things are *public* occurrences, and the person who perceives them "is convinced that someone else can equally see and touch the same tree and the same stone as he himself sees and touches" (13). Ideas, on the other hand, are *essentially private*; they "need an owner" (14) and each idea "has only one owner; no two men have the same idea" (15). It is meaningless to talk about an idea separate from its one and only particular owner—as if ideas could float in space or be passed

[3] The core of transcendental idealism is that the possibility of having *ideas* requires that certain thoughts be grasped,

around between several different people. It is part and parcel of my *ideas* that they are *my* ideas.

Many of the citizens of the realm of *ideas* refer outward to the world of things, such as sights, feelings, hearings, remembrances, and so on. These ideas are the very phenomena that give us conscious access to the world of things. Because of these links, one might be confused into taking some kind of representational stance towards ideas: that what we really see are our own ideas, which are the sensory effects caused by outside things. And if this is the view that we take, one might ask whether these ideas look alike: do two people have the same sights? We might respond with "Yes" if they have the same faculties of sight; "No" if, for example, one is red-green colorblind. Both of these views, however, reflect confusions about the role of ideas, and in fact one confusion is based on the other.

Sensory ideas are not perceptible objects: we have perceptions *through* them, but we do not have perceptions *of* them. When I see a green field, I do not stand back and look at my visual impression of the green: "I *have* it, but I do not *see* it" (14, emphasis added). Ideas are not public objects of perception, but rather essentially private. If a red-green colorblind friend and I are walking in the field and come across a strawberry plant, we can meaningfully ask whether we are seeing the same *thing* through our perceptions. We can also say that whereas I do see the color difference (taken as a property of the things, not as a sense impression) between the strawberry and its leaves, and my friend, who is red-green colorblind, does not. But since ideas are essentially *private* we cannot ask whether we have the same or different sense-impressions of it:

> Now does my companion see the green leaf as red, or does he see the red berry as green, or does he see both with one colour which I am not acquainted with at all? These are unanswerable, indeed, really nonsensical questions. For when the word 'red' is meant not to state a property of things but to characterize sense-impressions belonging to my consciousness, it is only applicable within the realm of my consciousness. (15)

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or more precisely, available to be grasped apriori. But if we follow the Fregean distinctions, these thoughts are still grasped through ideas.

Ideas are imperceptible and personal, things are perceptible and impersonal. Because ideas are *essentially* private, "any idea someone else has is, just as such, different from mine" (15). And hence "it is impossible to compare my sense-impression with someone else's," as we had attempted to do in asking whether my friend and I have the same color impression. The denizens of the realm of ideas are *radically non-comparable* between minds: for to compare them, I would have to bring your idea into my mind, which would make it *my* idea rather than *yours*.

If ideas cannot be compared between minds, then it follows from that that all such questions about whether someone has a first-person subjectivity *like I do,* whether their ideas are structured in the same way as mine, or *like* mine, are of the same order of the question "does my companion sees the green leaf as red, or does he see the red berry as green, or does he see both with one colour which I am not acquainted with at all?" And although Frege does not draw this conclusion, it also follows from this non-comparability that my ideas are *non-communicable*. I cannot structure a judgment or a statement in such a way as to convey my ideas to your mind, or your ideas to mine. And, as a consequence, I cannot neither pose the question, nor provide the answer, as to whether another person—let alone a pig—can be said to be owners of ideas like mine, or whether they can have a consciousness which is like my first person subjectivity. Any attempt to do so violates the very nature of the realm of ideas.

Yet I cannot accept that I dwell alone in a world full of mindless zombies. I live in a world with other rational agents. I speak with them about strawberries, and triangles, and other public things, and there doesn't seem to be any explanation for my saying that they *see* and *feel* and *talk about* things, except to posit that they, like me, have *sights* and *feelings* and *grasp thoughts*—all of which are ideas. And, from the beginning of the discussion, And surely I had a similar impulse with regard to animals, to say that they at least *see* and *feel* things, though they

may not be aware of what they are seeing or feeling.

All of these worries can be defused, however, once we untangle what is meant by 'attributing consciousness.' The ordinary conception of the task is that when I attribute consciousness to someone, I posit that she has a first-person subjectivity which is like mine, and that she and I can share what is going on in our experiences of the world. However, in the conventional view, there are actually two processes which are being conflated. Untangled, these two quite different occurrences are:

1. Imagining that *I,* in my *first person* subjectivity, were embodied in the person or animal that I have picked out.
2. Standing in an *I-Thou* relation to the person or animal that I have picked out, regarding them as a *second person* in communicative community with myself.

In (1), as in the conventional view, I speak of first-person subjectivity in the other body. But what happens here is not that I posit some second first person consciousness. Rather, I imagine that *my* mind is relocated into some other body, and I wonder what I would see given that certain things were different about *me.* There is no risk here of illegitimate idea comparisons, since I am only speaking in terms of my first-person subjectivity. The *sights* that I imagine are *my sights,* the feelings I imagine *my feelings.*[4]

In (2), as in the conventional view, I attribute something from safe at home in my own body, and I do not project myself out of my own body through make-believe. However, unlike the conventional view, I am speaking of something quite apart from the realm of private ideas. I do not recognize the person as an imagined mansion for *me,* but rather as someone quite different from me and yet connected with me through communication. In this realm we can also speak of *sights* and *feelings,* but what these words designate are no longer ideas, and so again, no worries about illegitimate comparison. They are pragmatic phenomena in the space of dialogue, part of a

[4] This explains one way in which, even though we cannot communicate our ideas, a friend may elicit a groan of

sort of Third Realm for the second person,[5] and the space of dialogue is by its nature shared.

It is because of the conflation of these two forms in the conventional view, that I come under the delusion that somehow I can intelligibly imagine (1) myself safe at home in my own body, and (2) a second *I* in another body, which is like my subjectivity, but with which I have no direct cognitive contact. The conventional view takes the projection of subjectivity from (1) and rolls it together with the intersubjectivity from (2), resulting in a chimera of the imagination which troubles all questions of consciousness attribution, including that of animal consciousness.

VIII. DO SWINE SEE THE PEARLS?

Given this analysis of consciousness attribution, we can now see that there are actually two different questions with regard to animal consciousness:

1. Can I make sense of what it would be for me, in my first person subjectivity, to be embodied as a pig?
2. Is a pig such a creature that I can enter into an I-Thou relationship with it and regard it as a second person in communicative community with myself?

Proper consideration of each of these questions, properly untangled, should help resolve the issue of animal consciousness.

It seems to me quite likely that I can enter into a communicative relationship with a pig—although only at a very primitive level. This does not seem to raise any particular questions for the Critical philosophy regarding the unity of my consciousness. Rather, it's a matter of being able to uptake the pig's behavior as actions of various sorts. I can grasp the pig's pain from hearing its squeals, and I grasp its sight by watching it gesture and react in response to what is in

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sympathy from me by mentioning her heartburn. The word 'heartburn' does not refer to an idea, but it brings me to imagine myself in her body, and elicits either a remembered or an imagined pain from heartburn.

[5] I am rustling a concept from Frege here. Frege holds that the Third Realm is the realm of thoughts, which are public like things but imperceptible like ideas. I want to suggest that the Third Realm contains thoughts, but that it also contains things such as sights and sounds (as second-person rather than first-person phenomena), ethical demands, aesthetic standards, and other items which may be best classified as being features of communicative

front of it. On the other hand, I cannot make sense of the pig having thoughts about animal consciousness, or wanting to go to the festival. There is no mode of connection between us that conveys these kinds of communications—the pig simply isn't capable of communicating them. Since I cannot make sense of the pig and I having that sort of discussion, I can make sense of why I would prefer to be Socrates.

Once we have examined the second-person account, we may wonder whether we even have to bother with (1) to make peace with the question of animal consciousness. Most of what we had wanted to explain was our ability to uptake the feelings, actions, and responsiveness of our pets and other animals with whom we temporarily stand as an I to a Thou. I suspect that most of the original worries about animal consciousness actually arise from the chimerical combination of this communicative uptake with the question of first-person subjectivity.

Supposing that we push forward with the question of imaginative projection, we again see that the problem might have evaporated. In imaginative projection, I counterfactually make-believe that *I* am in a pig's body and doing what a pig; there is not some objective thing which I posit to be lodged in the pig's head, and so there does *not* seem to be the same demand that I imagine myself without reason or the categories. The assumption of (b) seemed to be based on the question of communicative uptake in (2): we say that pigs lack reason in certain ways not out of any theory about their incommunicable first-person subjectivity, but rather to explain the very limited modes of communication we have with them. In this case, the Kantian rephrasing of (b) was simply an error. Imagining myself in a pig's body, doing what a pig does, I can go along thinking about animal consciousness and Kant and so forth with my K-conscious mind. Now, I might be extremely frustrated by being stuck in a body that could not speak or write. And I

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community.

would probably be very bored doing the thing that a pig does in a given day. But I would be no less K-conscious than I was in my own body. Here, neither (a) or (c) would need to be rejected.

On the other hand, part of what I make-believe when I imaginatively embody my mind, is that my mind could be different in character in the other body. If I imagine that I am Socrates, I do not just suppose that I am going around in an ugly Greek body with the same old thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears, etc. that I have today. Rather, I imagine that I am different in certain ways which would make my actions more aligned with Socrates's actions. Similarly, if I really want to get at being a pig, then it won't do to imagine my whole mind transported into the pig's body. What I should do if I want to compare being a pig with being Socrates, then I should 'know both sides of the comparison,' as Mill writes—I should imagine myself as Socrates, with my mind attuned to what Socrates does, and as the pig, with my mind attuned to what the pig does.

Kant's writing on the issue is actually on exactly the right track with regard to the method of inquiry. In the passage which Paton and Kemp Smith pick over, Kant wrote of the problem as what would follow "if I conceive of myself as an animal," and then went on to describe the H-consciousness that he believes would be his consciousness if he were a pig. Kemp Smith disagrees that this is possible—since there is no consciousness except K-consciousness, if I imagined my mind in a pig I could not imagine myself as having an H-consciousness.

At this point, interestingly, the question is no longer over whether animals have consciousness in the way that Paton and Kemp Smith had originally posed the question—not surprisingly, since they both seem to have thought of the issue, unlike Kant, in terms of the conventional view of consciousness attribution. Properly understood, the question of animal consciousness only impacts the Critical philosophy in the quite restricted case of this question: is it the structure of consciousness such that I can imagine myself embodied as a pig with an H-

conscious mind completely divorced from objective purport on the world? If Paton and Kant are right, then I can do so, because my impressions are such that they could come without being cognized as an object under the categories. If Kemp Smith is right, then I could not, and the best I could do would be to imagine my K-consciousness living within the confines of the pig.

If I could imagine myself as an H-conscious pig, it would be an extraordinarily queer sort of existence. In particular,

1. I should not be aware of anything around me as an object, since objectivity comes only with the categories.
2. I should not be aware of myself or any of the ideas of which I was H-conscious: "I should not thereby be able to know anything, not even to know this state of myself" (Kant, qtd. in Paton 333). Under the Refutation of Idealism, inner sense—consciousness of myself—is not possible without an outer sense of objective purport.
3. My ideas could follow certain patterns according to the rules of association; but I could not have any awareness of these associations; for the animal "distinguishes between the two things, but he does not know wherein the differences consist. He may, for example, have in smell a clear idea of the 'mark' of meat, but he does not know that this is a mark of meat; he does not, in short, possess concepts, and still less does he possess categories" (Paton 334-335n9).
4. I would not live in any objective succession of time. With the loss of the analogies of experience, "Then all succession of perception would be determined in apprehension, i.e., merely subjectively; but this would not at all determine objectively which item in fact precedes in perception and which follows. We would in that way have only a play of presentations that would not refer to any object whatever; i.e., our perception would not at all distinguish one appearance from others in terms of time relation." (A194 = B239).

Similar spooky results would follow from the loss of various other aspects of the categories.

If I were to imagine myself as an H-conscious pig, it seems that I have begun by making believe that I inhabit a pig's body and doing what a pig does in its daily routines. It was assumed that these are of such a low order that I would not need human reason to do so, but only the rhapsody of sensations from H-consciousness to push and pull my organism about. But given the consequences of the putative H-consciousness, there no longer *is* a pig's body, or a world, or time, or anything else for me. This seems to violate the boundaries of the thought experiment. Further, while it may seem selfish to demand that any world there is be a world *for me,* it also

seems to me to be of the very essence of transcendental argument—and thus, the Critical philosophy—that 'an intelligible world' is the only way the term 'world' can be made sense of.[6]

The prospects for elucidating what it would be for me to imagine myself with only H-consciousness seem pretty dim, and I doubt that it can be successfully achieved. However, with the recognition that we are talking about imaginative projection rather than some posited mind-object, there is a felicitous way out. I should not reject either (a) nor (c), but follow my original decision to reject (b). In imagining myself as a pig, I share not only consciousness with Socrates, but K-consciousness. However, while I presuppose the categories as Kemp Smith says that I must, and consequently I presuppose K-consciousness of an objective world in space and time, I simply imagine that my consciousness is different in certain respects, specifically, that it is unspeakably stupider in the employment of these categories, and less adept in the synthesis of memory or imagination. Here I can also see make Mill's comparison and prefer to be Socrates rather than the pig, since I would prefer not to be unspeakably stupid or a constant amnesiac. And in this way I can make sense of my intuitions about the consciousness of a pig, while retaining the intelligibility of the world and remaining within the bounds of the Critical philosophy.

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[6] Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 3.031: "It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic.The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world would look like."